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(C.F. Camerer).The Cognitive Basis of Financial Decisions
Many ﬁnancial decisions have a big inﬂuence on people's lives and these decisions are made at
many levels in the economy. For example, what mortgage a household chooses affects its
ﬁnances substantially. The speciﬁcs of what mortgages are available, and how they can be
described, are often constrained by government policy. The cumulative effect of millions of
homeowner mortgage decisions, along with the government policy and corporate decisions
about how mortgages are bundled and traded, inﬂuences mortgage rates and availability.
How well this ﬁnancial ecosystem works is sensitive to cognition at all levels, ranging from
homeowner confusion or gullibility to public sentiment that inﬂuences policy to whether large
banks correctly understand (and ‘price’) the systemic risk inherent in our complicated modern
ﬁnancial network. The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, followed by the Great Recession, is an example of
how mistakes and perverse incentives in this system can snowball to disaster. Until recently,
there has been limited cognitive and neuroscientiﬁc evidence regarding the mechanisms that
underlie ﬁnancial decisions.
We describe some of this recent research at four levels of ﬁnancial decision making in which
cognitive principles play some role: (i) household ﬁnance (see Glossary) decisions about
saving, borrowing, and spending; (ii) patterns in individual trading of ﬁnancial assets; (iii) how the
decisions of investors in the market aggregate to determine asset prices; and (iv) managerial
decisions about raising and investing corporate funds.
A brief history of ﬁnancial economics will set the stage. In the early 1950s, Modern Portfolio
Theory (MPT) began to formalize ideas of how a rational investor would invest in a set of assets
by accepting risk to earn higher ‘returns’ (which are percentage changes in asset prices). ThisTrends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.07.003 661
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Glossary
Actively managed fund: a portfolio
of assets that are traded by a fund
manager with the objective of
outperforming a benchmark, usually
charging higher fees (1–2%/year)
than an index fund.
Disposition effect: the tendency to
sell assets with accumulated capital
gains (‘winners’) more often than
assets with capital losses.
Efﬁcient markets hypothesis: if a
market is efﬁcient, prices reﬂect all
publicly available information. An
important implication is that, if
markets are efﬁcient, buying stocks
based on publicly information will not
lead to excess returns on average.
Financial literacy: the knowledge of
basic facts of how asset and credit
markets work that is necessary for
good household ﬁnance decisions.
Household ﬁnance: decisions by
households about the use of ﬁnancial
instruments–credit, mortgages, stock
and bond ownership, and retirement
savings.
Index fund: a mutual fund that buys
a large, diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks
in an effort to match the performance
of an index basket (e.g., the
Standard and Poor's 500), saving on
trading fees compared with active
management.
Price bubble: an episode in which
asset prices are persistently above an
intrinsic or fundamental asset value
and eventually crash.
Reinforcement learning (RL): a
learning algorithm where an agent
uses feedback from previous
experience to update the
representation of a stimulus or
environment.
Theory of mind: the capacity to
mentalize about the desires, beliefs,
and intentions of other goal-driven
agents.theory formed the foundation of ﬁnancial economics for several decades and made many
surprising and sharp predictions; for example, about how investors choose which stocks to hold
and what market prices would result from these decisions.
By the early 1980s, some researchers began to uncover facts about the aggregate stock
market that were difﬁcult to explain with this fully rational view of the world. For example, a
classic paper that is often cited as the beginning of behavioral ﬁnance demonstrated that stock
prices ﬂuctuate too much to be justiﬁed by a rational theory of stock valuation [1]. This set of
anomalous facts only grew stronger. More ﬁnancial economists then began to create new
mathematical models where investor behavior was governed by increasingly realistic psycho-
logical forces.
Over the past 30 years, researchers have made signiﬁcant progress in rigorously testing these
behavioral models of ﬁnance, often incorporating principles and methods from the cognitive
psychology of judgment and choice [2,3]. Most recently, research in ﬁnancial decision making
has begun to use emerging sources of data such as fMRI, Google searches, and logins to online
trading brokerages. In the rest of this review, we outline several of the advances that have been
made in this research area and speculate on future directions where cognitive science can play a
key role in advancing our understanding of ﬁnancial decision making.
Household Finance
The study of household ﬁnance has recently boomed due to a combination of excellent data and
an interest in helping households after the 2008 Great Recession. The general conclusion from
this evidence is that many households do not save and invest according to normative models [4].
These mistakes occur despite the principles for optimal ﬁnancial decision making being some-
times simple and intuitive and new technology sound decision making easier than ever.
The empirical facts about household ﬁnance do not vary much across eight developed countries
in North America and Europe [4]. (Much less is known about developing countries, in which
banking is often done informally through social relationships.) In those developed countries,
most people (>92%) have checking accounts. One- to three-quarters have some retirement
assets or life insurance but only about 15% hold stocks or bonds directly or hold mutual funds.
Looking at a household's balance sheet of assets and liabilities, the largest asset shares are
lived-in housing (around 50% of wealth), with smaller shares of 10–20% in retirement assets,
bank deposits, and vehicles. On the liability side, mortgage and vehicle debt are about 40% of
what people owe. Credit card debt is substantial in the USA, Canada, and the UK (10–12%) and
much lower (1–3%) in other European countries.
Almost all of the risky assets that US households own are now held through deﬁned-contribu-
tion pension plans administered by employers. Before the 1970s, most plans had ‘deﬁned
beneﬁts’, which guaranteed the amount of beneﬁt paid on retirement (as does American Social
Security). Then laws changed and now most workers and companies pay in contributions that
are deﬁned, but beneﬁts are not guaranteed; depend on the investment success of the pension
plans. This change in plan structure has reduced risk for companies and increased risk for
workers.
The shift away from deﬁned beneﬁts makes saving for retirement more important in the USA than
ever before. In the USA, many people retire with too little saved to maintain their level of spending
[5]. Even professional National Football League (NFL) players, who earn millions of dollars per
year on average, either save too little or invest too recklessly, so that 15% of them declare
bankruptcy within 12 years after retirement [6].662 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9
Households tend to make several distinct types of mistakes and many households have low
ﬁnancial literacy (Box 1). It is often difﬁcult to show that a speciﬁc ﬁnancial decision is
necessarily good or bad because that judgment might depend on a household's patience
toward the future or willingness to bear risk. However, some decisions are clearly mistakes. For
example, many employees fail to invest in a company retirement plan that matches the employ-
ee's contribution. Since employees can potentially gain from the company's matching contri-
bution and then withdraw such funds without a fee when they are old enough, failing to
contribute to gain the company's match is a mistake [7]. People also hold bonds on which
interest is taxed, although those taxable assets could be easily moved to a tax-free retirement
account to avoid taxes [8]. Homeowners also fail to reﬁnance mortgages, which would save
thousands of dollars on future interest charges, even when ﬁrms make it easy to do so [9,10].
Allocations between N different mutual funds, for the purpose of spreading risk, is biased toward
simply 1/N into each, which can be a mistake [11] (and is susceptible to ‘framing’ effects like
those seen in many psychological laboratory experiments [12]).
Another pattern of household investment that appears to be a mistake on average is the
household preference for investing in actively managed funds (which try to pick outperforming
stocks, usually holding them for months or years). Typical fees charged by such funds are 1–2%
per year but almost all studies show that the universe of actively managed funds does not beat
the overall market, especially net of fees [13]. Most households in developed countries can easily
choose index funds. These funds charge much lower fees (often as low as 0.1% per year) and
simply try to match the performance of a large index such as the Standard and Poor's 500 stock
index. These funds have grown over the years but still represent only a small fraction of totalBox 1. Financial Illiteracy
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much do you think
you would have in the account if you left the money to grow? (Possible answers: more than $102; exactly $102; less than
$102; do not know; no answer).
In a 2004 survey, only 67% of households chose the correct answer [5].
Four other simple questions were given on the survey. Financial literacy is deﬁned as getting at least two of those ﬁve
questions right. In the USA, ﬁnancial literacy is disconcertingly low among people aged 18–24 years, at 43% and 32% for
men and women, respectively. Those rates rise steadily to 86% and 73% for ages 65–69 years then decrease again at
older ages. Financial literacy is similar in other countries.
People who are aware of their ﬁnancial illiteracy should shop around or seek ﬁnancial advice. However, large variations in
fees and interest rates, even for standard products such as credit cards [96], mean that households are not shopping
around enough (otherwise high-cost products would be squeezed out of the market). Financial advisors also do not
always help their clients, often pushing high-fee products [97]. Households are also strategically naïve about their
advisors’ intentions [98], consistent with laboratory experiments on strategic naïveté [99,100].
Financial literacy can be increased, but doing so with simple education is more difﬁcult than one might imagine [5,10].
Fortunately, some social and psychological inﬂuences have been shown to help. University employees were more likely to
sign up for tax-deferred retirement accounts if they received an invitation (offering $20 to attend); employees who did not
receive an invitation but whose colleague received an invitation were also more likely to sign up [101]. Planning for
retirement also seems to be accelerated by personal experience, such as seeing the ﬁnancial condition of older siblings
and parents [5,102].
The psychological ‘status quo bias’ [103] led behavioral economists to advise companies to ‘default’ employees into
investing some of their pay into 401(k) stock accounts (i.e., they are auto-enrolled but can easily opt out). Making opt-in
the default increased employee saving. A 2006 US law then required companies to auto-enroll their workers [104].
Standardized disclosures required by law have also made it easier to compare products. Disclosures that made high-
cost fees salient reduced payday loans [30]. Requiring credit card disclosures in a ‘Schumer box’ (in 12-point font) saved
consumers US$11.9 billion [105].
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investment (about 10%). There is no consensus on why active management is so popular. A
plausible psychological principle is that households misunderstand the roles of luck and skill.
They expect a fund to perform poorly after a short streak of high returns. When the fund then
does well (perhaps luckily), they become mistakenly convinced that the fund's managers are
skilled [14].
An important question for policy analysis is whether competition among ﬁrms helps or hurts
borrowers who make bad credit decisions. Economic analysis is excellent for answering this
type of question, but good psychological evidence is also necessary to understand what
mistakes are made and by which types of borrowers. It can be shown mathematically [15]
that even when credit card companies compete for proﬁts, naïve borrowers who underestimate
how much they will borrow and how quickly they can repay will accumulate large fees and
interest charges. Imposing restrictions such as interest-rate caps helps naïve borrowers. Many
new studies extend this type of general analysis.
As people are living longer in most parts of the world, how aging affects ﬁnancial decisions
becomes increasingly important. Older people appear to make poorer decisions in novel
ﬁnancial environments but often use crystallized intelligence and expertise to compensate
[16,17]. The scarce neuroscientiﬁc evidence that is most relevant to household ﬁnancial
decisions concerns aging and patience. There is tentative evidence that people become more
patient as they age [18]. Consistent with this behavioral evidence, in older adults the reduction in
neural activity in the ventral striatum (VSt) is smaller [17]; that is, early and delayed rewards
generate more similar activity in older adults. (The VSt encodes a wide variety of anticipated
rewards, including primary rewards such as liquid, learned rewards such as money, and social
rewards, and reward-prediction errors [19].)
Newer studies are showing the interaction between neural circuitry involved in memory and
valuation [20,21]. Thinking about future rewards that are timed to personally important events
increases patience (probably because it makes the future more salient) [22]. This enhanced-
imagination effect is linked to increased connectivity between the hippocampus and cingulate
cortex, two brain areas involved in memory consolidation and retrieval and conﬂict monitoring. At
the behavioral level, imagining one's future self through age-progressed facial renderings
increased savings behavior in an experiment [23]. Important work remains to be done extrapo-
lating from understanding how memory affects patience to natural decisions that households
face (such as tempting credit-card spending).
Owing to the ﬁre hose of ﬁnancial information available to households, it is hard to pay attention
to everything. It follows that the ﬁnancial information that receives disproportionate attention is
likely to have a larger impact on household decisions and, potentially, on market prices [24]. Over
the past decade, economists have begun to generate clever measures that can be used to
understand what variables are proxies for investor attention. For example, Google searches of
individual stock ticker symbols as a measure of attention [25] can be used to measure attention
to a speciﬁc stock. This real-time measure of attention has been shown to predict stock prices
over the subsequent 2 weeks. Investors are also likely to pay less attention to ﬁnancial news on
certain days of the week. Stock prices adjust less to corporate earnings announcements that are
delivered on Fridays compared with other weekdays [26].
Recent research has used data on online brokerage logins to directly measure attention to a
household's portfolio. Investors tend to allocate more attention to their portfolio when markets
are rising [27] and when there is less market volatility [28]. Once investors allocate attention to
their portfolio, investors must choose what part of the ﬁnancial statement or online trading
platform to attend to [29]. The salience of certain attributes on ﬁnancial statements and contracts664 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9
has been shown to affect payday-loan borrowing [30], trading behavior [31,32], and bank-
account overdrafts [33].
Individual Investor Trading
Normative theories based on a risk–reward tradeoff predict that individuals will invest a positive
fraction of their wealth in the stock market and will hold a large, diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks.
However, a large body of empirical evidence shows that investor behavior often deviates from
this normative benchmark. These deviations are systematic and give rise to a set of stylized facts
that characterize the trading patterns of individual investors [2]. For example, one robust and
well-known trading pattern among individual investors is the disposition effect–the greater
tendency to sell stocks that have gone up in price after they were bought (‘winners’) compared
with stocks that have gone down (‘losers’). The disposition effect is evident in individual trading
records from retail brokerages [34,35], professional money managers’ trades [36], and labora-
tory experiments that carefully control the statistical process of price movements [37] (Figure 1).
While the disposition effect is now a solid empirical fact, its cause is still debated (Box 2).
Individual investors also tend to invest in stocks that are headquartered close to their home, a
pattern called ‘home bias’. For example, investors disproportionately invest in local stocks–in
their home countries and home states–which generates an undiversiﬁed portfolio and concen-
trates risk rather than spreading it out [38,39]. Worse yet, investors often invest in their own
company stock, exposing them to a dangerous scenario of losing both labor income and stock
market wealth if their company suffers ﬁnancial distress. The psychological mechanisms that
generate home bias are not precisely known. Three likely mechanisms are a direct preference for
familiar stocks [39], an aversion to ambiguity [40], and a desire to ‘keep up with the neighbors”
stock returns [41].
Another prediction of normative models is that individual investors should trade infrequently,
mostly to rebalance the risk in their portfolio or to liquidate assets (e.g., to pay for college).Box 2. Using Neuroimaging to Understand the Cognitive Mechanisms of Trading Biases
Economists have documented many patterns regarding how individual investors trade stocks but less is known about
the cognitive mechanisms that generate these patterns. For example, there are various competing theories that can
potentially explain the disposition effect (i.e., the tendency to sell winning stocks more often than losing stocks)
[35,106,107]. One recent hypothesis is that investors derive utility directly from the act of selling a winning stock
and derive disutility from selling a losing stock [108,109]. This ‘realization utility’ hypothesis is difﬁcult to test using
behavioral data alone but methods from cognitive neuroscience have proved useful in testing the theory.
In a recent experiment [110], human subjects traded stocks while inside an fMRI scanner (Figure 1A). The average subject
exhibited a large disposition effect, although it was a costly mistake. Figure 1B shows a spike in neural activity in the
striatum on selling a winning stock. By contrast, there was no spike in activity when the subject chose not to sell the
winning stock. This neural signal provides evidence that is consistent with the realization utility hypothesis of the
disposition effect.
Some investors also exhibit a ‘repurchase effect’ whereby they are more likely to repurchase stocks previously sold that
have gone down in price than those that have increased in price since the last sale [111]. Using the same data and design
as above, a combination of neural data and trading data could be exploited to test the regret devaluation mechanism of
the repurchase effect [92]. This theory states that after experiencing regret over ‘missing out’ on a purchase, or from
selling too early, the stock under consideration is subsequently devalued.
The average subject exhibits a signiﬁcant repurchase effect. When a subject receives news about a price increase for a
stock he does not own but had the chance to previously purchase, activity in the VSt decreases (Figure 1C). This
decrease in VSt activity is interpreted as a regret signal and the strength of this regret signal explains variation in the
severity of the repurchase effect across subjects. There is also evidence that the disposition effect and repurchase effects
are highly correlated within subjects (Figure 1D), suggesting that a common cognitive mechanism may generate both
trading biases. We speculate that there may exist similar correlations among other well-known trading biases generated
by common mechanisms.
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However, the data indicate that most individual investors who trade at all trade too much and
lose money by doing so [42]. Such ‘overtrading’ may be driven by overconﬁdence, in the sense
that investors mistakenly believe they have better information than they actually do. Another
explanation for the high volume of trade is that investors derive entertainment from doing so. One
interesting study shows that speeding tickets (a proxy for sensation seeking) and perceiving
one's intellect to be above actual intellect (a proxy for overconﬁdence) are associated with higher
trading frequency [43].
Trading biases can also be generated by deviations from Bayesian learning. For example,
investors use reinforcement learning (RL) [44,45], learn asymmetrically from good and bad
news [46], are overconﬁdent when interpreting new information [47,48], underweight non-
events that are actually informative [49], and overextrapolate from past returns [50].
Given the robustness of extrapolative beliefs across a wide variety of investor classes, this bias
offers a promising ingredient that can explain key facts about the overall stock market such as its
historical high rate of return over bonds and the excessive movement of prices [51]. The origin of
these extrapolative beliefs is still not fully understood, although some research suggests that
they may stem from a mistaken belief in mean reversion [14] or from lower-level perceptual
processes proposed in cognitive science [52].
There is also a great deal of heterogeneity in trading behavior among individual investors. One
important source of this heterogeneity is likely to be genetic. Twin studies have shown strong
genetic effects on ﬁnancial behavior, including risk taking [53], underdiversiﬁcation, and over-
trading [54]. Women born with male twins, who are exposed to elevated testosterone in utero via
the fetal membranes, take more ﬁnancial risks (and the size of that effect accounts for almost half
of the well-established gender difference in risk taking) [55].
Because the central focus in both behavioral and rational theories of ﬁnancial decision making is
on the tradeoff between risk and return, early work in neuroﬁnance began by investigating the
neural correlates of these two key variables. This research documented that greater neural
activity in the VSt was associated with higher investment in risky assets and that neural activity in
the anterior insula was associated with investing in safer assets [56]. The latter ﬁnding is
consistent with a role for the anterior insula in interoception of bodily states and emotions,
including uncomfortable sensations such as uncertainty and pain [57]. Contemporaneous work
showed that expected-reward signals are found in the VSt and so-called ‘risk-prediction errors’–
a computational signal tracking changes in the amount of variability (risk)–are found in the
anterior insula [58,59]. There is also evidence that priming subjects with positive stimuli increases
risk taking and that this effect is mediated by increased activity in the VSt [60].
More recent work using neuroimaging during stock trading has examined the psychological
underpinnings of trading biases such as the disposition effect and the repurchase effect (Box 2,
Figure 1). In addition, advances in fMRI technology have allowed ‘hyperscanning’, where multiple
subjects can be scanned simultaneously allowing researchers to probe the neural activity
generated in a market setting where prices are set by aggregating the decisions of all subjects.
This ability to collect data during market trading is useful because of the impact that social forces
have on trading behavior [3]. Moreover, the ability to scan multiple subjects at the same time can
be exploited to study interesting aggregate phenomena such as stock market bubbles and
crashes, which we discuss in the next section.
Asset Pricing
For decades, a central focus in ﬁnancial economics has been how asset prices are set and what
makes prices move up and down as a result of collective activity. (Empirically, this means666 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9
analyzing market-level data rather than data from individuals.) One of the key conceptual
innovations early in the study of asset pricing was the efﬁcient markets hypothesis. Essen-
tially, this hypothesis states that if markets are efﬁcient, then prices should reﬂect all available
information [61]. For example, in an efﬁcient market once a company announces an earnings
report this new information should be quickly and accurately incorporated into the stock price.
However, evidence challenging the efﬁcient market hypothesis has accumulated over the past few
decades. In the mid-1980s, economists found that investors tended to ‘overreact’ to bad news:
after a series of poor-earnings years, investors overreacted to the bad news and became
excessively pessimistic [62]. Other studies showed an opposite pattern of ‘under-reaction’:
investors tended to bid up the price of a stock after good news was released, but by too little [63].
The efﬁcient market hypothesis also implies that prices should not respond to information that
does not change a company's value. For example, advertising of a company's products tends to
spill over to temporary gains in the company's stock price and ﬁrms appear to choose
advertising strategically (to some extent) to boost their stock price [64].
One way to explain these kinds of empirical facts is to create models of investor behavior that are
informed by cognitive science and are then combined with important constraints on institutional
practices. (For example, a practical constraint is that even sophisticated traders who know
prices are too low may be unable to buy aggressively to correct the mispricing if they are
evaluated by short-term performance.) One important ingredient in this behavioral ﬁnance
approach to asset pricing is the type of ‘preferences’ that investors have. The standard rational
model typically uses preferences based on the expected utility (EU) hypothesis, while behavioral
ﬁnance has made progress using other preferences, most notably based on prospect theory
(PT) (Box 3).
Stock prices are also likely to be inﬂuenced by an investor's (time-varying) mood. When investors
are in a good mood, they may be more prone to taking risk. Economists have investigated this
link by measuring the impact of weather and sporting events on stock returns. For example,
stock returns are higher on sunnier days, even controlling for rain and snow levels [65] (indicating
that bad weather, which may decrease labor productivity, does not fully account for the effect).
Winter months are associated with lower stock returns, which is consistent with investors
experiencing seasonal affective disorder [66]. On the day after a country loses a World Cup
soccer match, that country's stock market tends to fall [67]. The hypothesized mechanism is that
the loss induces a bad mood, thus increasing risk aversion and in turn decreasing demand for
risky stocks.
However, studies with ﬁeld data are not able to pin down the precise cognitive mechanisms that
generate the pricing effects. For example, does an increase in mood causally change an
investor's taste for risk or does it instead lead to higher expectations of returns (or both)?
Recent experimental evidence suggests that mood affects ﬁnancial decision making through
both a preference [68] and a beliefs [69] channel and future work could help investigate a
potential interaction between these two causes.
As in the study of individual trading, there is very little neuroscientiﬁc evidence related to
aggregate asset pricing. One study measured neural activity as experimental traders tried to
infer whether artiﬁcial stock prices moved because other traders had inside information about
stock values [70]. There was more activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, a region that is
well known for its role in theory of mind. Subjects who made the most money scored more
highly on the ‘eyes of the mind’ test, a measure known to correlate with the capacity to infer
intentions of others.Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9 667
Box 3. Risky Choice and PT
Theories of ﬁnancial decision making describe how people perceive, weigh, and integrate risks and rewards. One
prominent theory is that people weigh the value (or ‘utility’) of all possible consequences, u(xi), from taking a risk by the
subjective probability of each consequence, pi. This integrated number is the EU of a risk:
P
ipi u(xi) [112].
While EU is normatively appealing, a large amount of laboratory and ﬁeld data is inconsistent with this theory. An
alternative theory of decision making under risk, PT, ﬁts many data better [113]. PT is popular in biology and social
sciences but is particularly useful in ﬁnance because of the fundamental role that risk plays.
Four features distinguish PT from EU. First, reference dependence assumes that individuals value outcomes relative to a
reference point. Second, the hedonic intensity of differences from the reference point has diminishing sensitivity. Third,
decision makers are more sensitive to a subjective loss (from the reference point) than they are to an equally sized gain
(‘loss aversion’). Finally, decision makers apply a decision weight, p(pi), subjectively overweighting small probabilities and
underweighting large ones.
These features of PT can explain a wide variety of ﬁnancial phenomena ranging from puzzles about the aggregate stock
market to systematic trading biases exhibited by individual investors [114]. For example, the tendency of investors to
overweight small probabilities predicts that stocks with returns that are positively skewed (‘lottery stocks’) will be
attractive to PT investors and become overpriced [115].
Another empirical fact is that the average return on US stocks is about 3–5% larger than returns on safer assets such as
corporate bonds [116] (although this number may be inﬂated by the unusual success of the US market). Mathematically, it
is difﬁcult to explain the size of this ‘equity premium’ difference in stock and bond returns unless investors are very averse
to ﬁnancial risk. The explanation from PT is that investors are loss averse and they ‘narrowly frame’ stock market risk,
worrying about returns each year rather than taking a longer view [117].
Ongoing research in PT goes in two directions. One direction is specifying which reference points are most natural:
candidates include status quo states, averages of historical outcomes, and expectations of future outcomes. Attention to
a reference point is probably also important. The second direction is establishing the psychological mechanisms that
generate nonlinear probability weighting. These are likely to include psychophysics of perception, salience of extreme-
value outcomes, and emotional response to risk.Two studies investigated price bubbles. Price bubbles are said to exist when asset prices
increase far above an intrinsic value based on economic fundamentals and eventually ‘crash’
back to the intrinsic value. Their existence and causes are controversial in academic ﬁnance
[61,71]. Bubbles can be studied in laboratory experiments by creating a known intrinsic value
that comes from monetary payments to subjects holding an asset that lives for 15 trading
periods, declining in value at each step. In experiments, prices tend to rise and peak well above
the intrinsic value, although bubbles are smaller and shorter lived when subjects participate
repeatedly [72,73] and when subjects are highly cognitively skilled.
One fMRI study using this paradigm found that in market sequences that exhibited bubbles,
activity in the ventral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) was more responsive to a trader's
portfolio value, and those regions were more strongly coactivated during bubbles. The strength
of that activity in the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC) was also correlated with the tendency to
participate in the bubble. These results suggest that a coordination of valuation and mentalizing
in the ventral and dorsal prefrontal regions are associated with bubbles [74].
A more ambitious fMRI study created experimental assets that had a ﬁxed intrinsic value over 50
trading periods [75]. Prices were entirely determined by 20 subjects trading among themselves
(two subjects were being scanned). Bubbles were common and activity in the nucleus accum-
bens tracked prices (Figure 2). Differential activity in the insula cortex between successful and
unsuccessful traders typically peaked several periods before the bubble crash, suggesting a
neural ‘early-warning signal’ associated with uncertainty or discomfort.
There is also some evidence of how asset prices in naturally occurring markets are associated
with physiological responses among traders. Professional traders showed psychophysiological668 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9
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Figure 1. An Experiment to Understand the Cognitive Mechanisms of Trading Biases. (A) The experiment comprises two screens: a price update screen,
where subjects see news about price changes, and a trading screen, where subjects can trade stocks. (B) Ventral striatum (VSt) activity time locked to selling decision
when given opportunity to sell a winning stock. (C) Areas of the brain where activity correlates with stock price change at moment when price change is revealed. (D)
Selling mistakes and purchasing mistakes are highly correlated within subjects. (A,B) reproduced, with permission, from [110]. (C,D) reproduced, with permission,
from [92].responses to price changes and trend reversals and more experienced traders showed lower
responses [76]. In another study with experienced traders, testosterone was positively associ-
ated with daily trading proﬁt [77], consistent with pre-game ‘androgen priming’ observed in
athletes [78]. Those experts’ cortisol levels also correlated with proﬁt variance across days and
with volatility in market prices. Other work shows that declines in the stock market are
associated with an increase in hospital admissions, particularly for psychological conditions
such as panic disorder and anxiety [79].
Managerial Decisions
Complex large corporations have thousands of employees. However, the most important
corporate decisions are often made by small numbers of individuals; typically, by the chief
executive ofﬁcer (CEO) and other top executives, overseen by the board of directors. Thus, while
it might seem odd to speak of how cognition inﬂuences the behavior of Intel or Apple, the
decisions of those corporations are likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by psychological propensities
of their top executives. For publicly traded companies, government reporting requirements also
mean that much is known about both the personal histories and the important managerial
decisions of CEOs [e.g., they must reports trades in their own company's stock to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)].
Large modern companies have gone through booms of merger and acquisition (M&A). Despite
the popularity of growth by acquisition, most studies indicate that acquisition is proﬁtable for theTrends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9 669
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Figure 2. Bubble Price Paths and Associated Neural Activity. (A) Price paths of 16 experimental market sessions where prices are set by the aggregate decisions
of subjects. The heavy black line is the average price over the 16 sessions. The fundamental value is constant throughout the sessions and equal to US$14 (dotted line).
Plotted below are normalized per-subject number of shares traded during each period. (B) Areas of the ventral striatum (VSt) where activity increased signiﬁcantly at
revelation of information that a trade was executed. This signal is consistent with the VSt encoding a prediction error in a call-market mechanism, since there is uncertainty
about whether a trade is executed after a subject enters an order. The color bar denotes the P values from the hypothesis test that there is no differential activity between
trials where subjects trade and trials where they do not trade. (C) Five-period moving average of the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal in an area of the VSt
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performing (red) traders from period 10 to 5 (before the eventual price peak). This insula signal is a candidate early-warning signal predicting a price peak and crash
several periods later.All panels are reproduced, with permission, from [75].takeover target but not always proﬁtable for the (typically) larger ﬁrm making the acquisition [80].
This led to the proposal that managerial ‘hubris’ or overconﬁdence fuels mergers [81].
Managerial hubris is one form of overconﬁdence exhibited in executive decision making.
Overconﬁdence among executives has been measured in various ways. One method used
a psychometric approach (asking executives to complete surveys over a 10-year period) [82]
while others have inferred overconﬁdence from whether executives forecast earnings too
optimistically [83] (compared with ex-post, actual earnings). Others methods look at how CEOs
are described in the press [84] or whether they hold on to stock options too long because they670 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9
expect their stock to rise [85]. All of these measures of overconﬁdence are correlated with the
business choices made by CEOs and more overconﬁdence is generally associated with poor
corporate decision making [83].
Personal experiences affect CEO behavior just as they do for regular households and investors
(Box 4). ‘Depression baby’ American CEOs–those who grew up in the Great Depression–are
also less likely to use corporate debt than their peers and those with military service take more
ﬁnancial risk in their companies [86]. There is tentative new evidence of gender effects among
top managers: female chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers (CFOs) were less aggressive about pursuing tax-
savings policies that might draw legal scrutiny [87].
The examples above provide evidence of psychological biases among managers. There is also
an extensive literature on how rational managers make decisions to ‘exploit’ investors with
psychological biases [88]. For example, managers seem to realize that investors have a
preference for low-price stocks and often issue more stock when this preference is strongest
[89]. There are now interesting new data that can be used to document the interactions between
managers and investors.
A fascinating source of psychological data is recorded ‘earnings calls’. These are large-scale
conference calls that CEOs and CFOs make several times each year to discuss with security
analysts what their company's upcoming accounting earnings per share are likely to be. These
calls are used to preempt bad news and talk up good news. One study analyzed the words thatBox 4. Experience Effects of Financial Outcomes and Behavior
Emerging studies are now showing that personal experiences systematically change large-scale ﬁnancial decision
making. For example, people living through the Great Depression in the 1930s suffered through years of massive
unemployment (25–30%) and economic dislocation. Their tendency to invest in the stock market was much lower than
for later generations, a pattern that has persisted for decades after the Depression [118]. People who lived through
periods of high inﬂation have higher expectations of future inﬂation than those who lived through periods of more
moderate inﬂation [119]. There is also evidence that adults from lower socioeconomic backgrounds have more
pessimistic beliefs about future stock returns [120].
Many studies have shown that traumatic experiences, such as exposure to violent civil war [121] or natural disasters
[122,123], change behavior in the next couple of years, sometimes increasing aversion to risk, although results are
inconsistent [124]. A remarkable survey of Korean War survivors [121] found that those who were children of 4–8 years
old during that war were more averse to ﬁnancial risk 50 years later (although there were no effects on children who were
either younger or older during wartime, consistent with ‘childhood amnesia’ in younger children).
These facts are consistent with a workhorse model of learning in decision neuroscience, reinforcement learning (RL),
which is a descendent of much older models in cognitive psychology. In RL, an agent updates the value of taking an
action (e.g., investing in a stock) based on the outcome received from taking that action [125]. This contrasts with
Bayesian learning, where the agent updates a subjective probability distribution of value after receiving new information.
Under a RL model, after experiencing a bad outcome from taking the ‘action’ of investing in the stock market during the
Depression, the value of this action is updated downward because of the negative outcome, thus decreasing the
probability of selecting the action again.
A simple RL-like ‘forgetting’ model, cumulating past experiences, is able to account rather accurately for US inter-
generational differences in buying stocks and bonds and guessing future stock returns. For a 50-year-old, the estimated
degree of forgetting implies that experiences 18 years ago are still about half as inﬂuential as the last year's experience
[118].
This type of extended learning from natural experience can be informed by emerging evidence that during economic
decision making that depends on associative memory, areas of the brain that store memory (hippocampus) exhibit
activation that correlates with activity in areas responsible for valuation (vmPFC) [21]. More generally, many economic
decisions are thought to draw on memory stored in the hippocampus [20], and heterogeneity across investors in these
stored memories (e.g., from the Great Depression or other traumatic experiences) may provide the neural basis for the
effects of experience on ﬁnancial decisions.
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Outstanding Questions
What is the reference point that inves-
tors use when tracking gains and
losses? How do investors update their
reference point over time?
How are the trading biases discussed
in this review correlated statistically? Is
there a small set of core psychological
mechanisms that generate many of
these biases?
What are the neural computations
underlying the effects of social conta-
gion and media reporting on stock
price movements?
What psychological and neural princi-
ples can explain an investor's prefer-
ence for stocks with low nominal
prices?
Where does overconﬁdence exhibited
in ﬁnancial markets come from (e.g.,
from personal traits or from experience)
and is it selected by, or limited by,
organizational design?
Can psychological theories of strategic
naivete, which were developed to ﬁt
controlled laboratory experiments
based on game theory, also help
explain naivete in ﬁnancial decisions?
Why do average household investors
pay substantial fees for actively man-
aged mutual funds, despite the evi-
dence that actively managed funds
do not generally outperform lower cost
index funds, especially after fees?CEOs used to predict implicit deception, as deﬁned by the difference between optimism during
the call and later accounting problems. Text analysis could predict deception about 10% better
than random [90]. Deceptive CEOs spoke more vaguely, used more extreme positive emotion
words, and used fewer anxiety words. Other research used the voice pitch of the CEO on these
conference calls to document vocal emotion markers, which were associated with contempo-
raneous changes in stock prices [91].
Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
We have surveyed a large set of empirical facts about the ways in which ﬁnancial decision making
is inﬂuenced by cognitive processes. These departures occur at all levels in the economy (from
households to CEOs). The literature in behavioral ﬁnance has forcefully demonstrated that these
robust decision anomalies have important consequences for individual investor wealth, stock
market prices, and regulatory policy. What is less clear, from a cognitive science perspective, is
the psychology that generates the observed patterns of saving, investing, and trading behavior.
Some progress is already being made on rigorously understanding the cognitive operations that
give rise to the pattern of observed ﬁnancial decisions (Box 2). This progress has come from
fruitful collaboration between behavioral economic theory (i.e., mathematical models of decision
making that incorporate psychological assumptions) and new data sources. For example, we
surveyed studies that use data on fMRI, computer logins to brokerage accounts, hormones,
genetics, and Google searches. We believe this newer set of data sources will be crucial in
measuring variables that are traditionally unobservable but integral to theories of realistic ﬁnancial
decision making.
One area where this newer data combined with principles from cognitive science can contribute
to behavioral ﬁnance is by determining how a very long list of behavioral effects can be explained
by a small number of principles. As we have described throughout, there is a large number of
trading patterns that are inconsistent with the rational use of information and the ideal balance of
risk and return. A useful next step in organizing this set of facts is to understand the correlation
structure among the various biases (see Outstanding Questions). We speculate that many of
these seemingly distinct biases could be generated by a common neural and psychological
mechanism. Some emerging evidence for this conjecture has already been found, as the same
brain areas encode signals that generate the disposition effect and repurchase effect [92]. This
neural overlap ﬁts with a strong correlation between these effects at the behavioral level
(Figure 1D).
Newer data can also help discipline behavioral theories of ﬁnance and will allow policymakers to
more accurately forecast the impact of new laws on human behavior. One successful program
that has already been effective in applying principles from cognitive science to regulation is
based on the notion of soft, paternalistic ‘nudges’. These nudges are simple changes that help
people to avoid what they themselves would consider mistakes but are not onerous for ﬁrms or
for people who already make excellent decisions [93,94].
The formal policy program began with the UK Behavioral Insights Team in 2010. There are now
dozens of units all over the world, in both governments and companies [95]. Hundreds of
randomized trials have been conducted to test which nudges improve ﬁnancial decisions, as well
as decisions about health and education.
Most of the research we described (and many nudge designs) use longstanding folk psycho-
logical constructs such as limited attention, emotion, salience, and the value of simplicity that
psychological limits imply. Frontier cognitive science has played a limited role in this booming
nexus of research and policy. For example, none of the studies of ﬁnancial attention that we672 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, September 2016, Vol. 20, No. 9
mentioned measured attention directly (as a vision scientist would, using eye tracking). Emotions
are also rarely measured directly. Perhaps our review will alert TICS readers to the exciting
interdisciplinary study of ﬁnancial decision making and promote broader, better collaboration
using the ideal combination of mathematical modeling, cognitive and neural measures, and
observed behavior.
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